935 A.2d 604
No. 974 C.D. 2007.Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.Submitted on Briefs: October 19, 2007.
Decided: November 9, 2007.
Appeal from the Board of Probation and Parole, Parole No. 9129-O.
Maureen McQuillan, Ebensburg, for petitioner.
Alan M. Robinson, Asst. Counsel and Victoria S. Madden, Chief Counsel, Harrisburg, for respondent.
BEFORE: COLINS, Judge, PELLEGRINI, Judge, McCLOSKEY, Senior Judge.
OPINION BY Judge PELLEGRINI.
John Abrams (Parolee) appeals a Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (Board) decision denying his request for administrative relief from a hearing panel determination that he was to serve as a convicted parole violator 24 months of back-time because the “most closely-related crime” to the Virginia crime of “Grand Larceny” under Pennsylvania Law was “Robbery.”
On April 12, 2005, Parolee, while on parole, was convicted of Grand Larceny in the Commonwealth of Virginia and received a 10-year sentence, but with eight years suspended. Parolee was returned to Pennsylvania, and after a hearing, was recommitted as a convicted parole violator with back-time of 24 months. The back-time imposed was determined under 37 Pa. Code § 75.2, which lists a range of back-time for each listed crime within which the Board, absent special factors, is to impose the appropriate back-time. When a crime is not listed,
37 Pa. Code § 75.1 provides that the presumptive range is to be determined by applying the range for the “most closely-related” Pennsylvania offense. “Grand Larceny” is not a listed offense, requiring the presumptive range to be the one of the “most closely-related offense.” When it ordered Parolee to serve 24 months back-time, the hearing panel found “Robbery” to be the most closely-related Pennsylvania offense to the Virginia offense of “Grand Larceny,” which had a presumptive range of back-time of 24 to 40 months. Parolee requested administrative relief claiming, that the hearing panel erred in finding that the most closely-related Pennsylvania offense to the Virginia offense of Grand Larceny was “Robbery,” not “Theft.” The Board denied the request, and this appeal followed.
Parolee contends that the Board erred in assigning the presumptive range for Robbery to determine back-time for his Virginia Grand Larceny conviction because, unlike Robbery, Grand Larceny does not have an element that the taking was from a person by force or threat of force. Because the element of harm or threat of harm is missing, Parolee argues that the most closely-related offenses in Pennsylvania are the theft offenses listed in the Crimes Code. Because the corresponding presumptive range under 37 Pa. Code § 75.2 for theft offenses is six to 12 months for a felony of the third degree or a misdemeanor of first degree theft, Parolee argues that his recommitment sentence of 24 months is impermissibly outside the presumptive range.
In ascertaining what is the “most closely-related offense” to calculate back-time, [t]he Board must look to the conduct for which the parolee was convicted, determine what crime that conduct would constitute if it occurred in Pennsylvania, and apply the presumptive range for the Pennsylvania crime. Harrington, 507 A.2d at 1315. In finding that Robbery was the most closely-related Pennsylvania offense, the Board relied solely on the certified court record of the Grand Larceny conviction, which merely listed the conviction and the sentence imposed. All that can be inferred from those documents is that Parolee was convicted of Grand Larceny, an unlawful taking committed without physical harm or threat of physical harm. The most closely-related crime in Pennsylvania is one of the theft crimes that was created when the Crimes Code superseded the Penal Code to subsume the then-existing non-violent crimes that involved the taking of money, including larceny.
Accordingly, because the most closely-related crime to the Virginia crime of “Grand Larceny” is theft, not robbery, that portion of the Board’s order imposing back-time is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the Board to determine back-time applying a presumptive range applicable to Theft.
AND NOW, this 9th day of November, 2007, the order of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole is reversed and the matter is remanded to the Board for the imposition of back-time in accordance with this opinion.
Any person who (i) commits larceny from the person of another of money or other thing of value of $5 or more, (ii) commits simple larceny not from the person of another of goods and chattels of the value of $200 or more, or (iii) commits simple larceny not from the person of another of any firearm, regardless of the firearm’s value, shall be guilty of grand larceny, punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional facility for not less than one nor more than twenty years or, in the discretion of the jury or court trying the case without a jury, be confined in jail for a period not exceeding twelve months or fined not more than $2,500, either or both.
(a) Presumptive ranges of parole back-time to be served will be utilized if a parolee is convicted of a new criminal offense while on parole and the Board orders recommitment as a convicted parole violator after the appropriate revocation hearing.
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(d) The presumptive ranges are intended to directly relate to the severity of the crime for which the parolee has been convicted. (e) The severity ranking of crimes listed in § 75.2 (relating to presumptive ranges for convicted parole violations) is not intended to be exhaustive, and the most closely related crime category in terms of severity and the presumptive range will be followed if the specific crime which resulted in conviction is not contained within the listing.
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the course of committing a theft, he: (i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon another; (ii) threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate serious bodily injury; (iii) commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of the first or second degree; (iv) inflicts bodily injury upon another or threatens another with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury; or (v) physically takes or removes property from the person of another by force however slight.