BARG v. SHEDAKER, 420 Pa. 122 (1966)

216 A.2d 325

Barg, Appellant, v. Shedaker.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.November 17, 1965.
January 4, 1966.

Negligence — Automobiles — Stopping in center of highway — Rear end collision — Causation — Legal cause.

Where A, who was driving his vehicle southwardly on a six lane highway stopped his car to discharge a passenger and there was approximately 18 feet between the right side of his car and the curb to the right, leaving two clear and unobstructed southbound lanes for other vehicles, and as the passenger passed in front of the car another southbound vehicle struck it in the rear and drove it forward into the passenger, it wa Held that A’s conduct was not a legal cause of the injuries to the passenger and that the court below had properly refused to remove a compulsory nonsuit in favor of A.

Before BELL, C. J., MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN, O’BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.

Appeal, No. 317, Jan. T., 1965, from judgment of Court of Common Pleas No. 2 of Philadelphia County, June T., 1963, No. 3841, in case of Florence Barg v. Robert R. Shedaker and Bernard Katz. Judgment affirmed; reargument refused February 10, 1966.

Trespass for personal injuries. Before DOTY, J.

Additional defendant’s motion for compulsory nonsuit as to plaintiff’s action against him granted, and plaintiff’s motion to remove nonsuit denied. Plaintiff appealed.

David Freeman, for appellant.

Perry S. Bechtle, for appellee.

OPINION PER CURIAM, January 4, 1966:

Bernard Katz, driving his car southwardly on Frankford Avenue in Philadelphia, stopped at a point opposite the P.T.C. Terminal, to allow his passenger,

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Mrs. Florence Barg, to disembark. Frankford Avenue at this place is a six-lane highway, 48-feet wide. Mrs. Barg alighted, walked south along the right side of the car, turned east and proceeded across the front of the car to a point just beyond the left front of the vehicle. She turned to wave “good-bye” to Katz, her son-in-law, when his vehicle was struck from the rear by a vehicle operated by Robert R. Shedaker. The impact drove Katz’ car forward and to the left, striking the plaintiff, inflicting injuries.

She brought suit against Shedaker, who brought in Katz as an additional defendant. At the termination of the plaintiff’s case, Katz moved for a compulsory nonsuit as to the suit against him, and the motion was granted.

The plaintiff appeals, citing in support of the contention that the nonsuit should be removed, § 1020 of The Vehicle Code, Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, as amended (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1020(a) and 1021).

Neither section applies to the facts in the case because it is clear that the stopping at the point indicated was not the proximate cause of the accident. The lower court properly said: “It is undisputed that at the point where the additional defendant stopped his car there was a clear view in each direction for approximately 500 feet, and there was approximately 18 feet between the right side of the additional defendant’s car and the curb on the west side of Frankford Avenue. There were two southbound lanes which were clear and unobstructed and the defendant Shedaker had ample room to pass the additional defendant’s stationary vehicle without colliding with it. Thus, the only proximate and effective cause of the accident was the patent and inexcusable negligence of defendant Shedaker, without which this accident would never have occurred.”

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The cases cited by the appellant cover fact situations not comparable with the one involved in the present litigation.

Judgment affirmed.