COMMONWEALTH v. PETERS, 453 Pa. 615 (1973)

306 A.2d 901

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.Argued May 3, 1973
Decided July 2, 1973

Criminal Law — Practice — Arraignment — Unnecessary delay — Pa. R. Crim. P. 118 — Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389 — Decision applicable to arrest made prior to date of that opinion.

1. The decision in Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, is applicable to an arrest made prior to the date of that opinion.

Page 616

2. The decision in Futch merely interpreted Pa. R. Crim. P. 118, which became effective May 1, 1970; the principles announced in Futch were the law in this Commonwealth after the effective date of Rule 118.

Mr. Chief Justice JONES and Mr. Justice EAGEN dissented.

Mr. Justice NIX took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Before JONES, C. J., EAGEN, O’BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY and MANDERINO, JJ.

Appeal, No. 175, Jan. T., 1973, from order of Court of Common Pleas, Trial Division, of Philadelphia, April T., 1972, Nos. 165 to 171, inclusive, in case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Charles Peters. Order affirmed.

Proceedings upon motion of defendant to suppress his statements. Before HAGAN, J.

Order entered suppressing certain statements. Commonwealth appealed.

Arthur R. Makadon, Assistant District Attorney, with hi James Shellenberger, Assistant District Attorney, Richard A. Sprague, First Assistant District Attorney, and Arlen Specter, District Attorney, for Commonwealth, appellant.

John S. Manos, with him DePaul and Manos, for appellee.

OPINION PER CURIAM, July 2, 1973:

The order of the Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Trial Division, of Philadelphia, entered November 16, 1972, suppressing appellee’s statements, is affirmed on the basis o Commonwealth v. Tingle, 451 Pa. 241,

Page 617

301 A.2d 701 (1973), Commonwealth v. Futch, 447 Pa. 389, 290 A.2d 417 (1972).

As for the Commonwealth’s allegation that our decision i Futch, supra, should not apply to any arrest made prior to the date of that opinion, we find this contention to be without merit. Our decision in Futch merely interpreted Rule 118 of Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective May 1, 1970. The principles announced in Futch were the law in this Commonwealth after the effective date of Rule 118.[1]

Mr. Chief Justice JONES and Mr. Justice EAGEN dissent.

Mr. Justice NIX took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.