J-175-00.Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District.Argued: December 5, 2000.
Decided: August 29, 2001.
Appeal from the Order of the Commonwealth Court entered 11/4/99 at No. 672 C.D. 99 affirming the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, Civil Division entered on 3/12/99 at No. 95 CIV 1039
OPINION IN SUPPORT OF AFFIRMANCE
MR. JUSTICE SAYLOR.
I join the majority in holding that the CAT Fund should not be attached to trials for the general purpose of fostering settlements. Because of the number and complexity of trials in which the CAT Fund is interested as a consequence of its statutory role as an excess insurance provider in the medical malpractice arena, it is my belief that our approval of the attachment practice would impose an undue and unworkable burden upon the administrative scheme. However, rather than concluding that the common pleas court lacked the power to enter its attachment order, I would simply disapprove subsequent attachments pursuant to an exercise of this Court’s supervisory powers. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 10; 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 502. Further, and in any event, I would uphold the trial court’s imposition of monetary sanctions upon the CAT Fund for its contempt of such order.
It is fundamental that courts possess inherent power to enforce compliance, and to punish non-compliance, with their lawful orders. SeeCommonwealth v. Marcone, 487 Pa. 572, 579, 410 A.2d 759, 763 (1980); In re Martorano, 464 Pa. 66, 77, 346 A.2d 22, 27 (1975); Brocker v. Brocker, 429 Pa. 513, 519, 241 A.2d 336, 338 (1968). In particular applications, the precise contours of the judicial contempt power are sometimes difficult to discern. Critical distinctions, frequently subtle and fine, are drawn on the basis of both the character of the underlying order in terms of whether it reflects an exercise of the court’s power or authority, and the nature of the subsequent finding of contempt as civil or criminal.[1]
The CAT Fund, however, did not lodge its appeal to vindicate its rights and interests according to any such distinctions applicable in this case; rather, it sought this Court’s intervention to avoid the systemic impact of future attachments. Although in its appellate brief the CAT Fund challenged, in summary fashion, the trial court’s power to find it in contempt of an order which exceeded the trial court’s authority, seeBrief for Appellant at 24 n. 9, at oral argument, counsel for the CAT Fund candidly and commendably acknowledged that: the CAT Fund ignored the trial court’s order; the proper course would have been to seek a stay and challenge the order through the courts; and, accordingly, the CAT Fund was not pressing its opposition to the sanction imposed. Thus, the CAT Fund appropriately acceded to the trial court’s reasonable and largely symbolic one-dollar per day fine, to be paid to the Lackawanna County Law Library, thereby clearing technical questions from the discussion in an effort to focus the Court on its core concern. This strategy not only sharpened the argument, but also demonstrated fitting deference to the courts’ interests, since, absent extraordinary circumstances, allowing litigants to simply ignore judicial mandates would seriously impede the ability of a court to manage the litigation before it and, more generally, the orderly administration of justice.
Dispositionally, therefore, I would affirm the order of the Commonwealth Court, leaving intact the trial court’s contempt order in this case.
Mr. Justice Cappy and Justice CASTILLE join this concurring and dissenting opinion.
(1947); Cliett v. Hammonds, 305 F.2d 565, 570 (5th Cir. 1962). Distinctions in terms of power, authority, and error are drawn in the following decisions: Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass’n v. International Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 453 Pa. 43, 50, 308 A.2d 98 (1973) (noting that a court must possess both personal and subject matter jurisdiction if its orders are to be enforceable in contempt proceedings); Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190, 42 S.Ct. 277, 281 (1922) (stating that an injunction must be obeyed, even if erroneous); Commonwealth v. Ryan, 459 Pa. 148, 159, 327 A.2d 351, 356 (1974) (same); Bowers v. Reitz, 315 Pa. 310, 314, 172 A. 707, 709 (1934) (declaring that the fact that an order is erroneous, improvidently granted, or irregularly obtained does not excuse violation of the order); Commonwealth ex rel. Keely v. Perkins, 124 Pa. 36, 48, 16 A. 525, 526-27 (1889) (observing that a court was empowered to enforce its order if the court possessed jurisdiction and such order “was lawfully made”); Commonwealth v. Roviello, 229 Pa. Super. 428, 438-39, 323 A.2d 766, 772 (1974) (observing that a “court’s power to punish for contempt is limited to situations in which it has both the jurisdiction and the power or authority to render the particular decree or order”) (citing, e.g., Keely). See generally 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contempt §§ 147, 148 (2000); P.H. Vartanian, Right to Punish for Contempt for Failure to Obey Court Order or Decree Either Beyond Power or Jurisdiction of Court or Merely Erroneous, 12 A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950).
MR. JUSTICE NIGRO.
I agree with the majority that the order of the Commonwealth Court should be reversed because the trial court should not have the power to direct a non-party representative with settlement authority to attend an entire trial. I write separately, however, because I believe that the trial court should be able to order a non-party representative with settlement authority to attend the first day of a trial. Since many cases tend to settle on the day of trial, such an order would give the court an opportunity to meet with the non-party representative, the individual who controls the purse strings, in an effort to effectuate a settlement and avoid the costs of a trial.