TRANOR’S ESTATE, 318 Pa. 206 (1935)

177 A. 820

Tranor’s Estate.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.January 14, 1935.
March 25, 1935.

Negotiable instruments — Alteration — Name of payee — Printed form of note used by bank — Burden of proof — Evidence — Possession of note — Consideration — Delivery — Presumption.

1. The lining out of the name of a bank as payee on a note which was the usual printed form of note used by the bank, and the insertion of the name of the substituted payee above the name of the bank, was held, on presentation of a claim on the note by the substituted payee against the estate of the maker, not to be a material

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alteration of the instrument so as to require the payee to show that it was made before signing, where the signature of decedent was not contested and the bank whose name had been lined out did not claim to be the payee of the note, which had been in claimant’s possession before the death of the maker and was produced by the claimant at the adjudication. [207-8]

2. Where a note is in the possession of and produced by the payee, the law will presume a delivery of the note for consideration unless the contrary is proven or the attendant circumstances prevent such a presumption. [208]

Argued January 14, 1935.

Before SIMPSON, KEPHART, SCHAFFER, MAXEY, DREW and LINN, JJ.

Appeals, Nos. 57-60, Jan. T., 1935, by contestants and administrator, from decree of O. C. Delaware Co., March T., 1932, No. 8, in estate of William J. Tranor, deceased. Decree affirmed.

Audit of account of administrator. Before HANNUM, P. J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Claim on note allowed. Contestants and administrator appealed.

Error assigned, inter alia, was final decree, quoting record.

William C. Alexander, with him Edward D. McLaughlin, for appellants.

Elgin E. Weest, for appellee, was not heard.

PER CURIAM, March 25, 1935:

Grace S. Starr, formerly the wife of William J. Tranor, presented a negotiable promissory note dated May 16, 1930, in the sum of $14,000, as a claim against his estate. The note was the usual printed form of collateral note used by the Cambridge Trust Company, with its name printed thereon as payee. The words “Cambridge Trust

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Company” were lined out in ink, but remained plainly visible, and the name of the claimant was written in ink above them. At the adjudication of the administrator’s account the claim was allowed, and this appeal followed.

The principal question now raised is whether the lining out of “Cambridge Trust Company” was a material alteration of the instrument such that the payee should be required to show it was made before signing. The signature of the decedent is not contested, and the Cambridge Trust Company does not claim to be the payee of the note, which was in appellee’s possession before the death of the maker and produced by her at the adjudication. Under these circumstances the change of name does not suggest an alteration, but merely the adaptation of the printed note to the purpose for which it was to be used, by striking out the printed words “Cambridge Trust Company” and substituting therefor the name of the person to whom the note was delivered and who was intended to be the payee. The use of a note in this way is a common everyday occurrence to which bankers take no exception. Checks are frequently used in the same way when necessary to draw on another bank than the one whose name is printed thereon. Such a change is not a material alteration; it is, rather, no alteration at all. The note only became negotiable when it was signed and delivered, and not until then does any change make an alteration. Having been produced by the payee, the law will presume a delivery of the note for consideration unless the contrary is proven, or the attendant circumstances prevent such a presumption. As to this, the learned judge of the court below heard testimony on both sides, and found as a fact that appellants had failed to show nondelivery or lack of consideration, and that on the contrary the testimony showed the note was given for a consideration.

The decree of the court below is affirmed.

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